establishes his claim by "evidence satisfactory to the court." 6 Default judgments against the United States under the Social Security Act, however, appear to require a stricter test. In cases brought by claimants seeking district court review of benefit denials by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 8 the courts must look to section 405(g) of Title 42, which requires that the Secretary's findings of fact be affirmed if supported by "substantial evidence." Section 405(g) makes no provision for claimants to establish their cases directly to the satisfaction of the courts. 9 The courts are divided over the applicability of section 405(g) in situations of governmental default. Although a majority apply the section strictly, 10 thereby effectively refusing to punish the Secretary for inexcusable delays, two circuit courts have invoked rule 55(e) or analogous provisions of the Federal Rules in support of a standard of review more favorable to claimants."' Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action .... As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .... The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or its [sic] decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based. Such additional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions. 10 See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. 11 See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
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After reviewing the case law and the alternative approaches, this comment concludes that section 405(g) provides the exclusive standard for judicial review and cannot be relaxed merely because the Secretary is in default. The comment then outlines the application of section 405(g) to various situations of governmental default, assesses the mandamus remedy, and concludes with a proposal for legislative reform that would better balance the government's interests and claimants' needs for speedy resolution of benefit disputes.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Rule 55(e)
The entry of a default judgment against a party in federal district court is governed by rule 55.12 Proof of a movant's entitlement to relief generally is unnecessary or left to the trial court's discretion. 18 By relaxing or eliminating the movant's burden of proving the merits of his substantive claim, rule 55 imposes a harsh forfeiture for default.
Rule 55(e),' which governs default judgments against the United States, imposes a more stringent requirement for obtaining a default judgment. Under this rule, a moving party must prove "by evidence satisfactory to the court" his substantive entitlement to relief against the United States. 1 5 The federal courts have enter-" The entry of default and judgment by default are treated somewhat differently under rule 55. An entry of default may be entered by the clerk against a party who has "failed to plead or otherwise defend." FED. R. Cxv. P. 55(a). Judgment by default is entered by the clerk only when the plaintiff submits an affidavit of a "sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain" and default has been entered against a defendant who has failed to appear. Id. 55(b)(1). If these circumstances do not apply, judgment by default may be entered only by the court, not by the clerk. Id. 55(b)(2). Rule 55(c) provides that an entry of default may be set aside by the court for "good cause." A default judgment may also be set aside under rule 60(b), which provides for relief from a judgment or order. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review tained motions for default judgments against a variety of federal agencies and administrators under this rule. 16 
B. Section 405(g)
Under section 405(g) of Title 42,17 claimants who are denied Social Security benefits by the Secretary may seek review in federal district court. I " This jurisdictional grant vests a district court with "power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. 9 "
After a rule 55(e) hearing, the court denied the government's motion to remove the entry of default but granted its motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that jurisdiction is a prerequisite to any judicial action other than dismissal of a complaint. is Judicial review directly affects only about one beneficiary in 3,000; only one beneficiary out of 9,000 is granted benefits as a result of judicial review. E. YOURMAN 
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Section 405(g) also provides the standard for reviewing denials of benefit claims: the Secretary's findings "as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 20 Substantial evidence has been defined as " 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' 21 Findings of fact include inferences supported by substantial evidence; 22 the court on review must consider the record as a whole, including the pleadings and a transcript of the administrative record. 23 Although the reviewing court may believe that the evidence supports the claimant, it must uphold the Secretary if substantial evidence supports his factual findings. 24 Section 405(h) 2 ' makes the jurisdictional and evidentiary provisions of section 405(g) exclusive. Under section 405(h), jurisdiction over factual issues in claims denials may not be grounded on general federal question jurisdiction 2 s or on the jurisdictional prohim when his decision was rendered"). 
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C. Delay in Claims Litigation
Although a claimant whose bid for Social Security benefits is denied by the Secretary may recoup delayed benefit payments if he successfully appeals the denial, 2 this process is lengthy and may inflict substantial hardship. The Secretary has frequently been castigated by the courts for delay and inaction in Social Security suits; 33 the claims process has been cited as a "labyrinth,"'" a "maze, ' 3 5 and "uncomfortably reminiscent of Alice's trip through Wonderland." ' suits which ... require the application of the statute to a set of facts, and which seek nothing more than a determination of eligibility claimed to arise under the Act." Id. at 789 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 32 Nonpayment during the delay caused by the review process would be an "underpayment," 20 C.F.R. § 404.501 (1981), and the Secretary would pay the balance due to the claimant, or, if the claimant were deceased, to his surviving spouse or children. 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2) (1976). Payments would be made from the date of filing the application or from the first month all requirements for entitlement were met, up to 12 months before the application, whichever was earlier. 20 
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In addition to the "glacial pace" 87 common in all governmental litigation, 8 the benefit appeals process is particularly drawn out because of section 405(g)'s requirement that the Secretary file with his answer a certified copy of the transcript of the administrative record. 39 The record is not transcribed until judicial review is sought by a claimant, and transcription, which requires playing a tape and identifying voices, is an "inherently slow" process.' 0 After transcription, the record is reviewed by the Department of Health and Human Services to decide whether to resist the claimant. If the decision is affirmative, the Department of Justice is then instructed to file an answer for the Secretary. 41 Although the answer must be filed within sixty days of a claimant's complaint, 42 the process of transcription and review frequently results in the Secretary's default.
II. ANALYSIS
The Secretary may default in several ways: he may file nothing;' 3 he may file a motion to postpone;" or he may file an answer 
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The University of Chicago Law Review combines with failure by the Secretary to produce a copy of the record.
A district court confronted with a default by the Secretary might respond in one of three ways. Invoking rule 55(e), it might enter a default judgment against the government if the claimant proves his claim "by evidence satisfactory to the court." Alternatively, it might invoke section 405(g), holding that the substantial evidence test requires it to await the Secretary's response and then to review the record for substantial evidence supporting his position. Finally, a court might invoke other sanctions against the Secretary for his default. After reviewing the case law, this part considers these alternatives in turn, concluding that review under section 405(g) is the only permissible route. The part then outlines a way for the courts to respond to the Secretary when he is in default that is consistent with section 405(g).
A. The Case Law
A majority of courts, including the Fifth," Sixth, 4 9 and Seventh 5 0 Circuits, have held that the substantial evidence standard of section 405(g) must be applied on review despite default by the Secretary, even in cases in which he fails to file an answer or submit the transcript of the administrative record with his pleading. 1 Acknowledging the general applicability of rule 55(e) in cases of default by the United States, these courts incorporate the section 405(g) requirement into rule 55(e)'s "evidence satisfactory to the § 405(g)") . 1278, 1281 (D.N.J. 1980 ) (court may not ignore the statutory command that the transcript of the administrative hearing be filed "as part of the answer," and therefore had "no course but to allow the answer, including the transcript which is part of it, to be filed" late); Bostic v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 686, 687, 692-93 (S.D.W. Va. 1979) (default judgment granted after review of the record; in cases involving rule 55(e) and section 405(g) the standard of evidence "is that of the statute").
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Williams v. CalifanoH is typical. In that case, the Secretary's answer was not timely filed because of delay in preparing the administrative record. The district judge denied a request for an extension of time, finding that the delay was due to inexcusable neglect. By the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's default judgment motion, the Secretary had submitted a transcript. The district court, however, did not consider itself bound by the administrative record; it found evidence sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim and entered default judgment under rule 55(e)."
The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment, pointing to two errors." First, the district judge had conducted a de novo review, had not given any weight to the determination of the administrative law judge, and had not confined himself to the evidence presented at the administrative hearing. Second, the district judge had looked for evidence sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim rather than for evidence sufficient to support the Secretary. The Seventh Circuit held that, in "considering the interaction of § 405(g) and Rule 55(e)," default judgment cannot be entered without consideration of the record. 5 5 If the reviewing court determines that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the Secretary, it must hold in his favor."
Two circuits have departed from this approach. In Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 57 the First Circuit vacated a default judgment entered by the district court" when the Secretary failed to file a brief. In remanding, the First Circuit stated that "so long as § 405(g) has any force, claimant can 'establish his claim' only by showing that there is no 'substantial evidence' supporting the Secretary." 59 After balancing several "legitimate interests," 60 however, the First Circuit held that when the Secretary fails to file a brief, the reviewing court need not "comb the record for substantial evi- 
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The University of Chicago Law Review dence with which to uphold the administrative decision. ' Instead, it can undertake the more "relaxed review contemplated by Rule 55(e)," relying on the claimant's brief to identify a lack of sufficient evidence in the record to support the Secretary's conclusion. 2 When the Secretary fails to file a brief, "the quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be less than [that] normally required" under section 405(g). 6 s Strict adherence to section 405(g), the court emphasized, would undermine the "meaning" and "purpose" of rule 55(e)."
The Ninth Circuit rejected the section 405(g) substantial evidence standard in Giampaoli v. Califano." 5 In that case, the district court found the claimant had met her burden of proving that she was unable to perform her former jobs but held the Secretary had not met his burden of demonstrating that she could perform other jobs. 66 The district court remanded for further administrative proceedings; when none was forthcoming, the court entered judgment for the claimant. 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an opinion that did not invoke section 405(g). 68 The court relaxed the evidentiary standard even further by restricting the scope of rule 55(e). It styled its decision as a judgment on the merits-not as a default judgment6 9 --and held that "rule 55(e) [and its "evidence satisfactory to the court" standard] does not apply once the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case and thereby shifted the burden of proof to the government." 70 Default in Social Security Litigation applies only to cases in which the government fails to respond to a complaint. 71 Both the First Circuit in Alameda 7 2 and the Ninth Circuit in Giampaoli 7s emphasized that rule 55(e)'s limitation on default judgments does not relieve the government of its duty to obey court orders. They justified this emphasis by analogizing to cases in which sanctions having the effect of a default judgment are imposed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) 7 4 for failure to comply with discovery orders. 7 5 The imposition of rule 37 sancclaimant, and that judgment for the claimant was therefore precluded. Id. at 256. In Giampaoli, the court accepted the Fifth Circuit's characterization of Carroll and distinguished the case at hand on the ground that the plaintiff "has done all that she was required to do." 628 F.2d at 1195 n.11.
1' Id. at 1193-94. According to the court, a narrow construction of rule 55(e) is preferable because the rule "puts the government in a privileged position above all other litigants. If this privilege is interpreted too broadly, the government obtains an undue advantage, which enhances its strategic position and upsets the overriding policy that civil litigants receive equal treatment." Id. at 1195. Limiting the protection of rule 55(e) to cases involving the government's failure to respond to a claimant, however, is unnecessarily extreme. Default judgments are entered against the government for reasons other than failure to answer a complaint; for example, one of the sanctions available for failure to comply with discovery orders is a judgment by default. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); infra note 74. The language of rule 55(e) would appear to apply to such cases, regardless of whether the government has answered the complaint. 1980) . 7' FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) provides that where a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: (A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party. '1 On the use of the rule 37(b)(2) sanction against the government, see 6 J. MooRE, tions, such as an order establishing facts in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order 7 6 does not require a rule 55(e) showing, even though the effect is similar to a default judgment.
The circuits are therefore in sharp disagreement over the application of section 405(g)'s substantial evidence requirement to situations of governmental default. Under the majority approach, the courts must always review the record for substantial evidence in favor of the Secretary, even where he is in default; accordingly, resolution must be delayed until he produces the record. Under the First Circuit's test, the courts can apply a "relaxed review" when the Secretary is in default. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, the courts can simply accept a claimant's assertions as fact and enter a judgment on the merits, at least where he has made out a prima facie case.
B. Rule 55(e) vs. Section 405(g)
It might be argued that Congress did not consider the problem of default judgments when it enacted section 405(g) and that the rule 55(e) standard should therefore be incorporated into the So- The courts have read provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the Social Security Act in other contexts. For example, the Act is silent on the procedural time limit within which the Secretary must file an answer; the courts have incorporated the sixty-day time limit of rule 12(a). 9 This argument is flawed for several reasons. The general/specific rule of construction is of little use here, for it can be argued that rule 55(e) is in fact the general provision, providing the usual evidentiary standard, while section 405(g) embodies the specific, "substantial evidence" exception to that standard. Moreover, the rule 12(a) analogy is inapposite: the Social Security Act contains no time provision, but it does contain a provision governing evidentiary review of the record. In addition, section 405(h) makes the substantial evidence standard exclusive, 8 0 and a rule permitting a claimant to prove his claim by presenting evidence satisfactory to the court directly conflicts with this command. In the Social Security context the district court does not act in its usual factfinding role, but sits as an appellate tribunal to review the record before it.
If rule 55(e) applied in terms, the court could review for evidence satisfactory to it if the Secretary defaulted through failure to file a brief, even if the administrative record were available." 1 Such a rule seems to be in direct conflict with section 405(g), requiring review of the record. Where the Secretary failed to file a transcript of the record, the rule 55(e) argument is stronger. Rather than continuing to grant the Secretary's motions to extend, the court, unable to evaluate the record, might grant a default judgment based on evidence presented by the claimant.
Such an application of rule 55(e), however, still appears to conflict with section 405(h), which limits review to the standard 78 See IA C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.16, at 248 (4th ed. 1972) ("A general statute applies to all persons and localities within its jurisdictional scope, prescribing the governing law upon the subject it encompasses, unless a special statute exists to treat a refinement of the subject with particularity or to prescribe a different law for a particular locality.") (footnote omitted 8 and the unfairness to claimants facing recurrent delays is manifest. Because the claims situation involves the public fisc, however, the courts must apply section 405(g) strictly: the Supreme Court has long emphasized the duty of courts to observe scrupulously the conditions defined by Congress for granting governmental benefits. 8 5 Relaxation of the substantial evidence standard would impermissibly intrude on Congress's control over benefit payments. The only way to mesh rule 55(e) and section 405(g) is to incorporate the substantial evidence showing as the required "evidence satisfactory to the court" under rule 55(e).
C. Rule 37
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produce in response to discovery requests. Such sanctions can include an order that designated facts be taken as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; 8 8 such an order can have the effect, though not the form, of a default judgment. In the Social Security context, a court that took as established a claimant's factual contentions would arguably avoid the problems of rule 55(e) and section 405(g); once a fact is accepted, the burden-of-proof issue is moot. The discovery sanction analogy is not appropriate in the Social Security context, however. First, a rule 37 sanction in a Social Security case so clearly has the effect of a default judgment that it should be limited to its context-violations of discovery orders. 8 9 The Secretary's duty to ifie a transcript of the administrative record is a pleading requirement and not a matter of discovery.' 0 Moreover, adopting the rule 37 analogy would violate the language of section 405(g). Rule 37 permits a court to take as established a claimant's designated facts, but section 405(g) requires an examination of the evidence in the administrative record.
D. Applying Section 405(g)
Once the rule 55(e) and rule 37 options are rejected, a court is arguably at the mercy of the Secretary. If section 405(g) requires review based on the administrative record, the court cannot act until the record is produced. Such an outcome can be criticized as unjust, unworkable, and as placing the Secretary instead of the courts in effective control of claims litigation.' 1 There are two responses to this argument: first, that it is a matter for congressional, not judicial, resolution;' 2 and second, that it does not preclude the courts from following a course of action that is manageable and consistent with the Social Security Act. This section outlines such a course of action.
1. Administrative record unavailable and Secretary does not intend to defend. If the Secretary altogether fails to respond to a claimant's complaint, he may be deemed to concede the case. This situation apparently presents only a conceptual problem. In pracSee supra note 76 and accompanying text. " One might question the legitimacy, even in the discovery sanction cases, of a court entering an order that has the effect of a default judgment so as to avoid an established test for entry of a default judgment. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review tice, the Secretary will request a remand for an additional hearing if he does not have enough evidence to evaluate the claim, 9 3 or file for an extension of time if the transcript has not been produced. 9 Such actions indicate that the Secretary has not yet decided whether to contest the claimant's appeal. Once the decision not to contest the claim has been made, the Secretary should, before he files an answer, request a remand for computation of benefits. 9 Such a motion approximates a confession of error and relieves the court of the need to decide the case on the merits in accordance with section 405(g).
2. Administrative record available and Secretary intends to defend. If the administrative record is available, the court should decide the case in accordance with the substantial evidence standard of section 405(g). 9 ' Although a brief or other legal memoranda might be helpful to the court, especially in deciphering the complex medical testimony in disability cases, 97 they are not essential under the statute. If the Secretary moves to file an answer or a brief "out of time,""" the court should follow a two-step process in resolving the request. First, it should decide whether there is "good reason" for the delay."' If not, the court should deny the motion and then decide whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the Secretary. 1 0 0 The broader response of the First Circuit in Alameda-permitting "relaxed review" of the record where
